RESEARCH PAPER
Marjan Velkovski
INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL · Scientific Article · 2023
UDK 341.171(4-672ЕУ):[329:342.5(497.7)
Proceeding from the premise that international statebuilding mechanisms are frequently used by the European Union (EU), particularly in Western Balkan states, this paper critically examines the effects from this effort, taking into consideration the Macedonian example. The focus of this analysis is on a specific phase of the prolonged statebuilding effort, evaluating the interaction among EU and Macedonia in the context of the so-called Przino process. The research reveals that EU’s approach to statebuilding through prioritizing regional stability and sustaining of status-quo situation in the state, even though it created a temporary stabilization of the internal political crisis; however, the political self-regulation’s capacity of EU candidate - member state is being problematized. The Macedonian experience, seen through the Przino process, shows that the applied mechanisms are transforming the state’s political order to a certain degree and are also problematizing the principle of popular sovereignty. Instead of strengthening institutions, non-institutional practices and entities are being established, that go beyond the state’s constitutional framework in certain aspects.
Introduction The fall of the Berlin wall for a large part of the former Eastern bloc meant opening of new perspectives for democratic transition, followed by integration to NATO and EU. However, the territory of the former Yugoslav federation (apart from Slovenia and in a certain period Macedonia) was engulfed with armed conflicts. The initial reaction of international actors was establishment of truce and/or peace as a priority, followed by a prolonged process of building the state through mechanisms of international statebuilding. The key agreements that subsequently initiated the implementation phase through peacebuilding (statebuilding and nation-building) programs were 1995 Dayton agreement, 1999 Kumanovo agreement and 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement . Over two decades later, one can conclude that this approach undoubtedly managed to establish a truce and ended the hostilities, yet the institution-building process, good gover nance and rule of law were the harder part of the task. The immanent weakness of target states, according to some authors, resulted in de facto protectorate democracies (or democracies with attributes). Thus, western actors redefined state sovereignty, which morphed to state capacity (instead of political independence). One of the harsher critics of the international statebuilding process, the British professor David Chandler notes that these interventions that are presented as an administrative assistance for state capacity-building, good governance and rule of law, are in fact creating weak states with no capacity for political self-regulation, no political legitimacy, and no ability to establish constructive relations with the respective society. Essentially, Western Balkans became the region to project EU’s soft power through capacity-building. Unlike previous experiences from the EU enlargement process in Eastern and Central Europe, Western Balkans witnessed a different approach, marked with conditionality and continuous reform demands that affect even state sovereignty. Using this approach throughout the years, the EU will become the key actor in Western Balkan states internal politics. This paper’s hypothesis is that international statebuilding in Macedonia failed to cre ate foundations for state’s self-sustainability with democratic features. The majority of these “statebuilding therapies” resulted in transformation of the country’s constitutional order, and reinforcing the same issues which are identified as a reason for external intervention in the first place. This thesis is being evaluated on the Przino process. The contents of the paper are organized in three key sections. The first focuses on briefly elaborating the statebuilding concept, with a particular accent of the developments in the Western Balkan region, in the broader context of EU’s politics of enlargement. The second part contextualizes the research problem by determining the conditions and causes that led to the signing of the Przino Agreement. The last part summarizes the key insights from the theoretical and empirical analysis, hoping to contribute to a larger academic debate regarding the effects of EU’s politics of statebuilding. From a methodological aspect, the study relies to a great extent on analysis of information from secondary sources, international documents and reports, NGOs and think-tank analyses, statements and opinions of official representatives and institutions, through which one can gain insight of the perspectives of the involved local and international actors in the political process crowned in one of the country capital’s settlements Przino.
First, the key concepts operationalized by this analysis need to be briefly elaborated. In fact, these concepts are mutually intertwined: statebuilding and fragility occurred either due to an authoritarian regime or internal conflict. According to one of OECD documents, statebuilding is viewed as an “endogenous process of strengthening of capacity, institutions and state legiti macy, and is driven by the relationship between the state and society.” Therefore, statebuilding is “primarily internal process which includes local actors, which means that international actors’ roles are limited.” On the other hand, fragility means a condition characteristic for weak states or state with weak capacity to execute basic functions of managing the territory and population lacking the ability to promote and develop mutually constructive and supportive relations with its society. This additionally creates low support for government policies and weak relations among the citizens and the state. Nevertheless, experience shows that there are slim chances (if any at all) for a chaotic society with weak institutions to internally self-democratize according to the liberal democratic model. According to the research of external interventions’ practi cal results in the context of statebuilding in fragile conditions, the theoretical notion disputes both key concepts. Therefore, these are contested concepts, that even if there is uniformity for having an analytical value, the differences occur in the context of the definitions’ contents and way of detection. The process of state rebuilding represents a complex set of initiatives and mechanisms focused on reforming state institutions, capacity, and political legitimacy, with the aim of pre venting restarting of armed conflicts. Against this background, the international factor became the one determining the stabilization framework for rebuilding institutions in ruined societies due to internal conflicts and/or authoritarian regimes. In case of EU’s involvement, it is about simultaneous efforts for democratization and Europeanization. The incentive for internal reforms in weak states is sought in the wishful EU membership, yet the process itself according to some authors is externally driven, with coercion and demands for increased effort. Thus, the process is not just endogenous, it also creates a culture of dependency, using Woelk’s terminology. The concept of failed states is also a subject of serious academic debates. Helman and Ratner give the simplest definition of the term failed states, being “a nation-state unable to sustain itself within the international community.” On the other side of the spectrum is Woodward’s position that claims the concept is arbitrarily used for enabling mightier states to intervene, more than often militarily. According to her, the concept lacks empirical logic, and the issue is located at the international actors that are promoting this qualification. Furthermore, the term Western Balkans can also be problematized. It represents a neolo gism promoted by EU institutions back in the 1990’s as a result of the geopolitical, economic, and cultural differences among EU member states and those from the region of Southeastern Europe. In fact, the term refers to South-eastern European states involved in EU enlargement process and are subjected to statebuilding. As previously pointed out, defining the statebuilding concept faces serious problems, due to the variety of opposed opinions. Statebuilding debates depend on the perception of involved actors on what the concept of state means, and what belongs out of the traditional defining models. For some, statebuilding is about the creation of new state institutions and a process of empowerment of established state capacities, anti-corruption strategies incentives, poverty reduction, as well as other reform and administrative measures. According to this definition, the Weberian approach of defining the state is being accepted, meaning that the state is being equated to state institutions. The other position argues that weak states are source of insecurity, therefore mechanism for dealing with weak states are needed. In fact, Francis Fukuyama noted that the statebuilding concept is the most important issue for the global community, because weak and failed states are the source of global security and economic problems. The third position argues that behind the phrase “capacity-building and empowerment”, transformed invasive forms of external regulation are being hidden, representing a veil utilized by external statebuilders for advancing their national and/or geopolitical interests. The literature, and practice as well, identify the following elements defining statebuilding as a process of building and empowering state institutional capacity: 1) existence of weak/fail ing/failed state; 2) internal and external actors involved in statebuilding; 3) plethora of interests, motives, goals, as well as process’ agenda including operationalization strategies; and 4) the outcome of the process. Against this background, David Lake considers that interventions in target-states are operationalized through local mediators (interlocutors), and the greater are the interests of external actors, the higher is the possibility of creation of a state incapable of self sustainability and lacking legitimacy, due to the different interests of external statebuilders and the ones of the local population. EU’s activities related to statebuilding in Western Balkans are guided by the assumption that there are standardized models of the notion of rule of law, human rights, democracy and the liberal market. EU’s involvement in statebuilding is through the established mechanisms such as the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, 2011 High Level Accession Dialogue , and the focus is on the rule of law, public administra tion’s reforms, protection of freedom of speech, development of market economy, and electoral system’s reforms as well. Such involvement could be seen through the internationalization of the mechanisms of domination by including a number of states and international institutions; Europeanization (internationalization) of vital state institutions for governance, creation, and inclusion of civil society sector in the policy decision-making processes, as well as through utilization of the “partnership” and “ownership” speak. The conditionality principle adapted in 1997 is the most important instrument within the SAP framework. Western Balkans states are bound to a subordinated relationship to EU’s mechanisms, and steps related to improved cooperation and eventual European integration are intertwined with accomplishment of political and economic reforms. EU’s aim in this process is the creation of a functional state in the image of EU member-states, through the implementa tion of EU’s aquis communautaire. Conditionality is perceived through the following rationale: if local political actors transform state institutions, the reward would be EU membership or opening negotiations at least. Such approach of imposing “top-down” pressure reveals certain deficiencies due to the veto mechanism at disposal of EU member-states. Recent example of imposing policies according to the “top-down” principle is the action of UN High Representa tive for BiH, Christian Schmidt by using his so-called Bonn powers, who suspended the Law on Properties in Republic of Srpska under the pretext that the law was unconstitutional and also some people to get to their senses, implicitly addressing the Bosnian politician Milorad Dodik. Florian Beiber additionally problematizes the conditionality policy due to lack of statebuilding rules and regulations, the constant effort to impose these policies, the non-synchronized approach of EU institutions involved in statebuilding, as well as the variety of opinions of individual EU member-states of what statebuilding entails. Next mechanism in EU’s enlargement policy arsenal is the concept of the rule of law. This concept assumes the principal place in EU political accession criteria, even though EU does not concisely define the concept. Besides the existence of stabile institutions guaranteeing democracy, protection of human rights and minority rights, the rule of law is also part of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria. In the context of EU’s enlargement, the rule of law is a topic in two chapters of EU’s accession process (Chapter 23 – Judiciary and basic rights and Chapter 24 – Freedom, justice, and security). The Copenhagen criteria, which are comprised of political and economic sub-criteria, still represent the main frame for deciding for eventual membership of EU candidate states. The incorporation of Copenhagen criteria in EU’s conditionality policy for accession of Central and Eastern Europe states resulted in prioritization of the rule of law agenda, while progress of candidate states depends (or should depend on) their compliance of a wide specter of reforms related to economy, good governance, human rights, democracy, and rule of law. In other words, with the help of international statebuilding’s mechanisms, besides coer cion, there is also a certain form of political pressure exerted to local political actors, “forcing” them to comply with the internationally adopted agenda by EU statebuilders. The process is overshadowed by the complex international involvement and EU presence and coupled up with the non-synchronized approach and conflicting views among EU member-states, instead of building state institutions and capacities, the process results in creation of progressively failing state without the capacity of self-governance and autonomy. In summary, one can conclude that within EU’s enlargement policy, the conditionality policy, foreign policy and the financial help are united in a set of mechanisms and stimulations through which EU exercises and legitimizes its transformative powers over EU candidate states, and the implementation of these statebuilding mechanisms directly affect the political, economic and societal order in the state subjected to transformation. Instead of promoting reforms of state institutions, that would originate from the people’s direct needs and will and in accordance with the “bottom-top” approach, the asynchronous approach of external statebuilders combined with the imposed “top-down” policies, internationalization of statebuilding mechanisms, prioritizing stability at rule of law’s and democracy’s expense, these policies lead to transforming of state sovereignty to a form of shared sovereignty, while local ruling elites lack legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate. According to a recent study, the conclusion for EU’s statebuilding can be summed up in the following sentence: “Western Balkan states are caught in a hybrid status quo in their democratic journey. The traditional arguments related to cost-benefit calcula tions, national identity or conflicting goals are insufficient to explain the gap between gradual improvements in the formal synchronization of membership criteria and stagnation, as well as deterioration of democratic performance. The authors rightfully conclude that EU’s political synchronization not just it has a limited impact over Western Balkan captured states, it also contributes to these inadequate governance models.
In brief, international statebuilding’s trajectory in Macedonia can be divided into three separate phases. The first phase refers to the period from 1991 to 2001, the second being from 2001 to 2015 and the last and current phase beginning from 2015 with the so-called Przino pro cess. The first two phases for Macedonia meant series of political crises, since the establishment of the independent Macedonian republic, the decades-long name dispute with Greece and the 2001-armed conflict. As a result of the conflict, the Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed which subsequently led to a set of constitutional changes. There were also several events that greatly affected the internal developments, such as the veto at the 2008 NATO summit in Bu charest , the Parliament crisis in December 2012 , the nonrecognition of local and presidential election results, the student protests and the wiretapping scandal in 2014. These events contrib uted to the increasing external involvement through the Przino process. Common denominator however, for the continuing political crises since 2001 were the internal dissonances as well as the ineffectiveness of external statebuilders. Even the EU Commission in the 2014 annual report for Macedonia’s accession progress noted that the process was at an impasse due to failure to implement the Commission’s recommendations, politicized state institutions, media control in context of elections, including the prevailing party interests over national interests. Although the seed was sown the previous year, the political crisis culminated in 2015. One can say that the crisis began with the law enforcement operation “Coup”, in which accord ing to the Macedonian MOI, the suspects, former Director of Administration for Security and Counterintelligence, Zoran Verusevski and the President of the then-opposition political party Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), Zoran Zaev, were suspected of using illegal means of monitoring and espionage, and in collaboration with foreign intelligence services were threatening state officials with the aim to overthrow the current constitutional order. The opposition nevertheless rejected the accusations claiming that the move was to defocus the public from the previously announced wiretapped communications possessed by the opposi tion leader. The political crisis gained another impetus with the disclosure of the wiretapped recordings which revealed incriminating conversations denoting corruption, electoral fraud, violations of privacy by political representatives of then-ruling government led by the political parties Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) and Democratic Union for Integration (DUI). Commenting on the political developments, then-UK Ambassador in Macedonia, Charles Garret affirmed that the conflicting parties should be presented with the issue of forming a transitional government. Reactions came from representatives of the European People’s Party and then-Senator Pedro Agramunt, who signed a declaration condemning the efforts to undemocratically overthrow the ruling government in Macedonia, as well as the irresponsible actions of the political opposition. During the same period, the media revealed that Garret openly supported Zaev and was allegedly directly involved in the overthrow of the Macedonian ruling government in coordination with other undisclosed governments. Despite all this, EU would soon define the general situation in the country as a “captured state” by ruling political parties. The polarized political situation peaked in May 2015 with mass anti-government protests in the so-called “Color revolution”, and triggered by the allegations of covering the murder of Martin Neskovski in 2011. In the same period, armed conflict erupted between the Macedonian law enforcement and an armed grouping affiliated to UCK in the Kumanovo settlement “Divo naselje”, where eight police officers lost their lives. In the aftermath of the incident, then-Minister of Interior, Gordana Jankulovska and then-Director of Administration for Security and Counterintelligence, Saso Mijalkov resigned. Moreover, Ahmeti also played a role in the Kumanovo developments, stating that he “convinced” the armed group to surren der for the common interest. Ahmeti’s gesture was hailed by the Ambassadors of Germany, France, Italy, UK and US in a joint statement after the meeting with him in Skopje. Observing the Kumanovo developments, the ambassadors pointed out their concerns for the sincerity of efforts to implement the democratic principles and values of the Euro-Atlantic community, which could hamper the country’s progress toward NATO and EU membership. The ambas sadors also noted the institutional weaknesses revealed with the wiretapping scandal, calling for specific reforms in the judiciary, freedom of speech, media freedoms, as well as reforming the electoral system. Meanwhile, the political crisis continued unfolding, as the leaders of the four largest political parties (Nikola Gruevski, Zoran Zaev, Ali Ahmeti and Menduh Thaci) were summoned for negotiations in Strasbourg on 18 May 2015 with the aim to end the political deadlock with mediation from EU and US officials. EU’s Parliament representatives Richard Howitt, Edvard Kukan and Ivo Vajgl were appointed for leading the negotiations that were conducted outside the Macedonian territory, and coordinated by the European Commissioner for Enlargement, Jo hannes Hahn. The meetings mediated by EU and US were held behind closed doors, while there were pro- and anti-government protests in the Macedonian capital, organized simultaneously. After several rounds of negotiations and interventions by EU, in March and April 2015 in Brussels, two meetings at the so-called Deputies’ Club in Skopje, the Strasbourg meeting the same month, and another one at the Deputies’ Club on 26 May 2015, during which Hahn already announced signing of a final agreement with which “the country would be allowed to continue further”, the political crisis culminated with the signing the Przino Agreement. With this agreement signed on 02 June 2015, the political crisis was frozen again. Simi larly, to OFA’s negotiations format, the Przino Agreement was signed by the four representatives of the largest political parties in Macedonia (DPMNE, SDSM, DUI and DPA), and in presence of EU representatives, Commissioner Hahn, then-Head of EU Delegation, Aivo Orav, as well as then-US Ambassador Jess Baily. The negotiations were conducted outside the state institutions with the four local political representatives in EU delegations’ residence in Skopje’s settlement Przino, and also outside the country (according to the exterritoriality principle). During the talks, the then-current ruling administration initially refused to accept the opposition’s terms for forming a transitional government six months prior the elections, neither creating of a special prosecutor’s body for dealing with the revelations from the wiretapping scandal. The agreement additionally provisioned the creation of a transitional period with detailed conditions that would end with free and fair elections by April 2016 and in accordance with European standards. The conditions were inter-party agreement for holding early elections, return of the political opposition in Parliament, creation of Parliamentary Investigative Com mittee to deal with the wiretapping scandal headed by SDSM, prohibition for further revealing of wiretapped recordings. SDSM was also obliged to surrender all audio materiel to the public prosecutor, and the State Election Commission (SEC) was set to be revised and its mandate expanded. Part of the agreement were also the obligations for inter-party agreement for struc tural reforms related to Chapters 23 and 24 of EU’s accession process, implementation of EU Commission’s recommendations regarding rule of law and in the context of 2011 HLAD. In addition, reforms for creation of independent state institutions, broadened media freedoms and full compliance with Venice Commission’s recommendations, were part of the agreement’s agenda as well. Against this background, early parliamentary elections were set for 24 April 2016, resignation of the ruling government 100 days prior the elections, electoral and media reforms, including the establishment of an independent Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) with a mandate to investigate the wiretapping scandal’s allegations. The Przino Agreement was followed by the recommendations of the expert group on the issues that emerged from the wiretapped conversations and related to the systematic rule of law. In this document, known as the Priebe Report, guidelines were given that referred to easier implementation of the Urgent Reform Priorities and related to the monitoring of communications, parliamentary oversight of intelligence services, justice system, elections and media. Although the agreement proclaims and advocates openness to other political parties and the inclusion of these parties in the process with their signature, the course of negotiations and the signing of the agreement were carried out outside the democratic political process in the country with the exclusive participation of the representatives of the four largest parties in Macedonia. This kind of non-transparency and non-institutional nature, on which the Przino Agreement was signed, without the participation of civil society and other parliamentary parties, and with the mediation of an external factor, always implies the delegitimization of the local political actors involved. The post-Przino period and the implementation of the conditions outlined in the agree ments of June 2, June 19 and July 15 was followed by blockades and delays by the parties in power, who considered that the deadline for fulfilling the provisions of the agreement was suf ficient, giving priority for respecting the date for holding early parliamentary elections. On the other hand, SDSM claimed that it was impossible to "purge" the voter list, reform the judicial system and SEC and create a technical government that would have the capacity to organize early parliamentary elections in a fair and democratic manner. Due to such conflicting views, SDSM announced that it would not participate in the April 2016 elections, after which the election date was initially moved to June and then to December 2016. Meanwhile, the SPO, established within the Przino framework on 15 September 2015, prepared its first indictment a year later. The fact that this institution was established with the Przino Agreement indicates that Macedonian institutions were dysfunctional in that period, since the creation was outside the existing constitutional and legal framework (and in particular, the public prosecutor), where instead of building state institutions within the framework of the concept of the rule of law, EU statebuilders placed politics above law under the guise of political compromise. SPO had had the staunch support of the international community. Similarly, as in past critical crisis periods, DUI also played a key role in this one, by refusing to submit the election candidate lists and as a result DPMNE was forced to accept the twice-postponed elections date in December 2016. According to the provisions of the Przino Agreement, at the beginning of 2016 a technical government was formed, whose mandate was shortened due to the resignation of the so-called auxiliary ministers from the opposition SDSM. The opposition MPs also left the parliament at the time. Such a move by the opposition was due to the fact that they considered that the conditions for conducting fair and democratic elections were not met and announced a boycott, while the ruling DPMNE stood firm on the position that elections would be conducted, even without the participation of the opposition. Few days before dissolution of the parliament, DUI withdrew its representatives from the executive branch. Consequently, the political crisis that should have been previously resolved with the signing of the Przino Agreement, additionally intensified. Analogous to deepening of the crisis, EU’s and US’ pressure increased, which was seen by contacts and visits of high political representatives in the country. For instance, at the be ginning of 2016, the then-President of DPMNE Gruevski visited US, where in a conversation with Joseph Biden, then-US Vice President, the importance of implementing the provisions of the Przino Agreement and creating conditions for organizing fair and democratic elections was highlighted. Furthermore, in July 2016, then-German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier appointed Johannes Haindl as the Special Envoy for Macedonia, and the same month Victoria Nuland, former Assistant to the US Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia, paid a visit to Macedonia. Nuland's statement that there were chances for introducing economic sanctions on Macedonia, should the political crisis persisted, represented the "motivation" for local political parties to reach a consensus on the unresolved issues stemming from the Przino Agreement. In the "Przino 2" agreement, which was again concluded in a non-transparent and non-institutional manner, the four main political actors, with the mediation of US Ambassador Bailey, agreed on the details of electoral reforms, the media, and the support of the SPO. It was also agreed that at the end of August 2016 an assessment to be conducted of the existence of conditions for early parliamentary elections. According to this agreement, the application of the Law on Internal Affairs was suspended until the beginning of 2017. The elections were held on 11 December 2016. This time again, VMRO-DPMNE won the majority of mandates, however the victory was barren because the party lacked coalition capacity. Namely, DUI refused to enter the ruling coalition offered by Gruevski. In addition to the new constitutional deadlines for formation of a new government (thanks to the undefined constitutional decisions and different constitutional practice), the crisis continued – first in the streets, and then culminated with the events of 27 April 2017. The intrusion of protesters into the Macedonian parliament during the Assembly’s constitutional session and the election of its new president became known as the "Black Thursday". MPs were injured in the event and after several hours of turmoil, police intervention prevented further escalation. Finally, after several months of obstructions by DPMNE and Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov’s refusal to pass the mandate for forming a government to the opposition leader Zaev due to allegations that Zaev accepted to implement the so-called “Tirana platform” ac cording to which the Albanian language would become the second official language in macedonia, in May 2017 the mandate was given to Zaev, nevertheless. Moreover, Ivanov requested written guarantees from Zaev that he will preserve the territorial integrity and constitutional order of the Republic. Subsequently, new government was formed, and criminal proceedings were instituted against a large number of protesters, members of the DPMNE, police officers, including the former Director of Bureau of Public Security Mitko Chavkov, indictments which resulted in multi-year prison terms. The "Black Thursday" events represented the epilogue of the political crisis in Macedonia, or rather the end of another dramatic episode in the country's political history.
The review of effects of EU statebuilding policy’s application in Western Balkans speaks of a complex trajectory and the existence of weak and fragile states that fail to meet the Co penhagen criteria. In their effort to assist, the EU applies a wide variety of mechanisms – from soft to more decisive, through which local political elites are required to adapt to the demands. The phenomenon of stabilitocracy that came to life in the region actually means that local elites perfected the approach of formal-legal and declarative acceptance of European standards and values, and in return they are granted freedom to act according to their narrow interests in the sphere of internal politics. In cases of deeper crises, EU representatives, usually in coopera tion with the US, intervene in the direction of "damage control". Such an approach leads to a certain kind of stabilization and “normalization,” yet it is far from real democratization and Europeanization. In the Macedonian statebuilding case, accompanied with the European integration process, besides adapting to neighboring countries’ demands (which are not related to the Copenhagen criteria), the process is burdened by the internal weaknesses of the dysfunctional political and economic system. The EU operates with soft power mechanisms, while US em ploys other less visible mechanisms surreptitiously to discipline noncompliant political actors. In such circumstances, citizens have few opportunities for action and active participation in politics from the "bottom-up” principle. The 2014-2017 crisis showed that even when there is a protest movement, the crisis management is in the hands of the party leaders, who are often the cause of the crisis themselves. The EU prefers status quo and stability; therefore, it accepts and exploits mechanisms which are not typical of normal democracies (even when they are facing their own deep political or social crises). Prioritizing stability and maintaining status quo, instead of promotion of democratic processes according to the “bottom-up” principle and stemming from the people as the bearer of popular sovereignty, as well as aiming toward the normative aspects of European integra tion, international statebuilders while intervening exploit local political actors to promote and accomplish their foreign policy and geopolitical interests. This discourse is realized in a non institutional and unconstitutional manner, and as a prize for their compliance, local political actors are given external political legitimacy, external financial aid, or in some cases guarantees that no economic sanctions would be introduced against individuals or the state. Such discourse enables the creation of a culture of political and criminal unaccountability at the local policy creators and decision-makers. Lastly, the Przino process was the result of an external intervention to resolve the crisis; however, it left consequences in the legislative process and in the sphere of the rule of law. The effects of this undertaking are dubious in light of the way in which the existence of the SPO ended with a scandal, the unresolved court proceedings and controversies related to them, yet also in the sphere of the constitution of government and the electoral process. The remnants of the Przino process are still present and will influence the political landscape in the next period as well, until these decisions are changed.
